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The Check Float Puzzle
Jeffrey M. Lacker
A
lthough the last few years have seen a dramatic surge in interest in
new electronic payment instruments, consumers and businesses in the
United States still write checks in vast numbers. Nearly 63 billion
checks were written in 1995 according to one estimate, representing 78.6 per-
cent of all noncash payments (Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
of the central banks of the Group of Ten countries 1995). Check use has con-
tinued to expand in recent years, despite the increased use of debit cards and
the automated clearinghouse; the per capita number of checks written grew
at an average annual rate of 1.3 percent from 1991 to 1995. Moreover, fore-
casts call for check use to remain around current levels for the foreseeable
future (Humphrey 1996). Because the social costs associated with the use of
paper checks constitutes the majority of the real resource costs of the payment
system—65.4 percent according to David Humphrey and Allen Berger (1990)—
it will be important to continue to seek improvements in the efﬁciency of the
check system in the years ahead.
The efﬁciency of check clearing is affected by the arrangements govern-
ing presentment and payment. These arrangements have a feature that is, for
economists, puzzling. Helen writes a check to John for, say, $100. When the
check is ultimately presented to Helen’s bank for payment, the bank pays
$100, and deducts $100 from Helen’s account. What is surprising, from an
economist’s point of view, is that the bank pays the same amount, $100, no
matter how long it took for the check to be presented. This implies that John’s
bank earns an additional day’s interest by getting the check to Helen’s bank
one day sooner. This feature is puzzling because it is difﬁcult to identify any
signiﬁcant social beneﬁts to Helen or Helen’s bank from getting a check from
John’s bank one day sooner; certainly nothing approaching the magnitude of
one day’s interest.
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stein, Tom Humphrey, Ned Prescott, Marsha Shuler, and John Weinberg provided helpful
comments on an earlier draft, but the author remains solely responsible for the contents of
this article. The views expressed do not necessarily reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 83/3 Summer 1997 1      
2 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Check ﬂoat is the time between when a check is tendered in payment and
when usable funds are made available to the payee (John in our example).1
Because John and his bank bear the opportunity cost of foregone interest until
the check is presented, they have an incentive to minimize the ﬂoat. But check
ﬂoat provides interest income for Helen and her bank. Under current arrange-
ments Helen and her bank implicitly reward John and his bank for reducing
check ﬂoat. Helen’s bank stands ready to turn over their ﬂoat earnings. John’s
bank thus has an incentive to capture those ﬂoat earnings by accelerating pre-
sentment. Another way to state the puzzle is that the beneﬁts to Helen and her
bank do not seem to justify the incentive provided to John and his bank to
minimize check ﬂoat. For this reason I call it the “check ﬂoat puzzle.”
The resolution of this puzzle is of more than intellectual interest. Because
collecting banks forgo interest earnings on the checks in their possession, they
have a strong incentive to present them as quickly as possible in order to min-
imize the interest foregone. Collecting banks are motivated to incur signiﬁcant
real resource costs to accelerate the presentment of checks. Check processors,
including the Federal Reserve Banks, routinely compare the cost of accelerating
presentment to the value of the ﬂoat. Checks are sorted at night and rapidly
shipped across the country. But if there is little or no social beneﬁt of accelerat-
ing the presentment of checks, then much of the real resource costs associated
with check processing and transportation would represent waste from the point
of view of the economy as a whole. It may be possible to alter this puzzling
arrangement and improve the efﬁciency of the payment system.
The check ﬂoat puzzle can be directly attributed to the fact that the laws and
regulations governing check clearing mandate par presentment; the payor owes
the face value of the check, no matter when the check arrives. Par presentment
implies that the real present discounted value of the proceeds of clearing the
check are larger the faster the check is presented. Par presentment essentially
ﬁxes the relative monetary rewards to alternative methods of clearing, taxing
slower methods of clearing relative to faster methods. As with any regulation
that ﬁxes relative prices, there is the potential to distort resource allocations.
In this article I argue that the distortion appears to be signiﬁcant. This is only
part of the story, however. There could be offsetting beneﬁts that make par
presentment a good thing. To justify current arrangements there would have to
be social beneﬁts of clearing checks quickly that payees and their banks—the
ones deciding how fast to clear the check—do not take into account.
The check ﬂoat puzzle is of interest to the Federal Reserve System (the
Fed), both as payment system regulator and as the largest processor of checks.
In the 1970s the Federal Reserve Banks established a number of Remote Check
1 This use of the word ﬂoat follows Humphrey and Berger (1990, p. 51). The reader should
be aware that some writers use the term ﬂoat in a narrow sense to refer to the time between when
the payee is credited and the payor is debited: see, for example, Veale and Price (1994).    
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Processing Centers (RCPCs) around the country with the avowed goal of accel-
erating the presentment of checks (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 1971; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1972). Critics
have argued recently that Federal Reserve operations should be consolidated to
take advantage of economies of scale in check sorting (Benston and Humphrey
1997). But closing down Fed ofﬁces could increase the amount of time it
takes to collect some checks. Should this result be counted against the decision
to close an ofﬁce? More generally, when performing a cost-beneﬁt analysis
of alternative payment system arrangements, what value should be placed on
changes in the speed of check collection?
Check Float
A few words about how check clearing works will be useful as background.
Checks provide a simple arrangement for making payments by transferring
ownership of book-entry deposits. Helen (the “payor”) writes a check and
gives it to John (the “payee”). John deposits the check in his bank, which
then initiates clearing and settlement of the obligation. A check is a type of
ﬁnancial instrument or contingent claim. It entitles the person or entity named
on the check, the payee, to obtain monetary assets if the check is exchanged in
accordance with the governing laws and regulations. One noteworthy feature
of the check is that the holder of the check is entitled to choose when the
check is exchanged for monetary assets. In other words, the check represents
a demandable debt.
John’s bank has a number of options available for getting the check to
Helen’s bank for presentment. John’s bank could present directly, transporting
the check itself or by courier to Helen’s bank. Alternatively, the check could be
presented through a clearinghouse arrangement in which a group of banks ex-
change checks at a central location. Another option is to send the check through
a correspondent bank that presents the check in turn to Helen’s bank. Or the
check could be deposited with a Federal Reserve Bank, which then presents
the check to Helen’s bank. These intermediary institutions could themselves
send the check through further intermediaries, such as clearinghouses, other
correspondent banks, or other Reserve Banks.
The length of time it takes to present a check depends on where the check
is going and on how John’s bank decides to get it there. First, the checks
received by John’s bank during the business day are sorted based on their des-
tination. Sorting generally occurs during the early evening hours. Afterward,
many checks can be presented to the paying bank overnight. A check drawn on
a nearby bank might be presented directly early the next morning. A group of
neighboring banks that consistently present many checks to each other might
ﬁnd it convenient to organize a regular check exchange or clearinghouse in
which all agree to accept presentment at a central location. Checks drawn on    
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local clearinghouse banks can generally be presented before the next business
day.
For checks drawn on other nearby banks it might be advantageous to clear
via a third party, such as a check courier, a correspondent bank, or the Federal
Reserve. A third-party check processor posts a deadline, usually late in the
evening, by which local checks must be deposited in order to be presented the
next day. Third parties also clear checks drawn on distant banks. Often such
checks can be presented by the next day as well, especially checks drawn on
banks located in cities with convenient transportation links. For checks drawn
on remote and distant locations, however, an additional day or two may be
needed to get the check where it is going. For example, a check drawn on a
bank in Birmingham, Alabama, and deposited at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond is usually presented to the Birmingham bank in one day, while a
check drawn on a bank in Selma, Alabama, is usually presented in two days.
When does John’s bank collect funds from Helen’s bank? If the two banks
do not have an explicit agreement providing otherwise, Helen’s bank is obli-
gated to pay John’s bank on the day her bank receives the check, provided it
is received before the appropriate cutoff time. If the check is presented by a
Federal Reserve Bank, the cutoff time is 2:00 p.m.; if anyone else presents the
check, the cutoff time is 8:00 a.m. Helen’s bank is obligated to pay by transfer
of account balances at a Reserve Bank or in currency; in practice Reserve Bank
account balances are the rule. Checks presented after the cutoff are considered
presented on the following business day.
A majority of the checks in the United States are presented in time for
payment the next business day. According to a recent survey by the Ameri-
can Bankers Association (1994), over 80 percent of local checks are presented
within one business day, while only about half of nonlocal checks are presented
within one business day (Table 1). Over 90 percent of the dollar volume of
checks cleared through the Federal Reserve are presented within one business
day.
What’s the Puzzle?
The puzzle is that the paying bank pays the same nominal amount no matter
how many days it takes to clear the check. Helen’s bank pays John’s bank the
face value of the check whether it takes one day, two days, or two weeks to
clear. To put it another way, an outstanding check does not earn interest while
the check is being cleared. The implication is that clearing a check one day
faster allows the presenting bank to earn an extra day’s interest. The presenting
bank’s gain is the paying bank’s loss, however; Helen’s bank gives up one
day’s interest. Why are arrangements structured this way?
At a superﬁcial level the answer is transparent. The presentment of checks
is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the Federal Reserve Act, and          
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Table 1 Number of Days It Takes to Receive Available Funds on
Checks Deposited through Banks’ Check Clearing Network
Average Percentage of Item Volume
By Bank Assets in Millions of Dollars
Less than $500 $500 to $4,999 $5,000 or More
Local Checks
Up to 1 business day 83.7 85.9 93.8
2 business days 12.7 11.0 5.9
More than 2 business days 3.5 3.1 0.3
Number of banks responding 159 61 29
Nonlocal Checks
Up to 1 business day 42.2 53.2 65.7
2 business days 40.8 31.1 24.3
More than 2 business days 17.0 15.7 10.0
Number of banks responding 159 60 26
Source: American Bankers Association (1994).
Federal Reserve regulations. In their current form, these legal restrictions re-
quire that checks presented before the relevant cutoff time be paid at par on the
same day.2 The result is that paying banks do not compensate collecting banks
for the interest lost while a check clears. Legal restrictions effectively mandate
that John’s bank is rewarded with an extra day’s interest if it clears a check
one day faster. The check ﬂoat puzzle is thus an artifact of legal restrictions
that mandate par presentment.
A deeper puzzle remains, however. Can we identify any economic beneﬁts
to Helen and her bank from faster check clearing? Are they large enough to
warrant the interest earnings captured by presenting faster? The answer, as I
will argue below, appears to be no.
Note that it is irrelevant how Helen and her bank divide between them
the additional interest earnings due to check ﬂoat. The question is why Helen
and her bank, taken together, would want to compensate John and his bank
(or someone presenting the check on their behalf) for presenting the check
early. Similarly, it is irrelevant how John and his bank divide between them
2 Under Regulation CC, checks presented by a depository institution before 8:00 a.m. on
a business day must either be paid in reserve account balances by the close of Fedwire (cur-
rently 6:00 p.m.) or returned (12 CFR 229.36(f)). Under Regulation J, checks presented by a
Reserve Bank before 2:00 p.m. on a business day must be settled the same day—the exact time
is determined currently by each Reserve Bank’s operating circular (12 CFR 210.9(a)).         
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the opportunity cost of foregone interest earnings. Taken together, they have
an incentive to accelerate the presentment of Helen’s check.
Some Efﬁciency Implications of the Allocation of Check Float
The check ﬂoat puzzle would be merely an intellectual curiosity if it had little
or no consequences for real resource allocations. Unfortunately, it appears that
the allocation of check ﬂoat earnings has a substantial effect on real resource
allocation.
Consider the situation of John’s bank, which has a range of options for
clearing Helen’s check. Some of these options are likely to differ in the speed
with which they get the check to Helen’s bank. Some clearing mechanisms
might present the check in one day and some, particularly if Helen’s bank is
located far away, might take two or three days to present. The one-day methods
have a distinct advantage for John’s bank, because investable funds are obtained
one day earlier. At the margin, John’s bank is willing to incur real resource
costs, in an amount up to one day’s worth of interest earnings, in order to clear
a check one day faster.
If, as I argue below, there is no identiﬁable social beneﬁt of clearing a
check one day faster, then the incremental resources expended to accelerate
check collection and capture the interest earnings are wasted from society’s
point of view. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. Check clearing speed
is measured in days along the horizontal axis in Figure 1 and is increasing to
the right. The position labeled “0” represents checks cleared the day they are
ﬁrst received, the position labeled “1” represents checks cleared one day after
they are received, and so on. For a hypothetical check, the bars labeled MPC
represent the marginal cost to the payees of clearing a check one day faster; the
height for a clearing time of one day is the incremental cost of clearing in one
day rather than two, the height for a clearing time of two days is the incremental
cost of clearing in two days rather than three, and so on. Since these are real
resource costs, they coincide with marginal social costs, so MPC = MSC.
The marginal beneﬁt to payees is measured by the horizontal line MPB; the
height is the extra interest gained from earlier presentment.3 If MPB exceeds
MPC, the check is not being cleared too fast, from the payees’ point of view,
while if MPC exceeds MPB, the check is being cleared too fast. Payees will
choose the fastest method of clearing checks that results in marginal beneﬁts
exceeding marginal costs.4 For the checks portrayed in Figure 1, payees will
3 I abstract from weekends, for which the extra interest would be three times as large as for
weekdays.
4 If interest compounds continuously and costs vary continuously with speed, then the payee
bank would choose a method for which the marginal cost of accelerating presentment equaled
the interest rate (MB).    
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present in one day; the marginal private cost of accelerating presentment in
order to clear the same day exceeds the marginal private beneﬁt.
I provide evidence below suggesting that the marginal social beneﬁt of
accelerating presentment is actually very small. Figure 1 therefore portrays
the marginal social beneﬁt curve MSB as relatively low for one-day clearing.
Although the quantities in Figure 1 are not based on explicit empirical esti-
mates, they are selected to illustrate the likely relative magnitudes involved.
The socially optimal speed of check clearing in Figure 1 is four days; clearing
any faster incurs marginal social costs that are greater than marginal social       
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beneﬁts. The gaps between MSC and MSB between four days and one day—
the cross-hatched bars—represent the deadweight social loss associated with
the way check ﬂoat earnings currently are allocated, as compared to a hypo-
thetical arrangement that results in the optimal clearing time. In this sense the
deadweight loss is “caused” by our existing check ﬂoat arrangements.
The value of daily check ﬂoat provides an upper bound on the incentive to
expend resources to accelerate presentment. A rough calculation gives a sense
of the potential magnitudes involved. The total value of the checks cleared in
1995 was approximately $73.5 trillion, or an average of $201 billion per day
(Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the
Group of Ten countries 1995). The overnight interbank interest rate averaged
5.83 percent that year, which corresponds to 0.016 percent per day. Multiplying
this overnight rate by the value of checks cleared yields $32.2 million per day
($201 billion times 0.000160), or $11.7 billion per year. This works out to
about $0.18 per check, and represents the amount of real resource costs that
would willingly be incurred by payees, like John and his bank, to present their
checks one day faster. This corresponds to the height of the marginal private
beneﬁt line (MPB) in Figure 1. Since payee banks will ensure that MSC does
not exceed MPB, it follows that MSC could be as large as $0.18 for the average
size check. If, as I argue below, MSB is close to zero, then the cross-hatched
bar for day 1 in Figure 1 is likely to be close to $0.18, or $11.7 billion in total.
For comparison, Kirstin Wells (1996) estimates that the total cost to banks
of processing and handling checks is between $0.15 and $0.43 per item.5 If
the marginal social beneﬁts of accelerating presentment by a day are close to
zero, then a substantial proportion of bank and payee processing costs could
represent socially wasteful expenditures. Moreover, additional resources might
be saved by clearing checks in three or more days, as illustrated in Figure 1
by the cross-hatched bars, for a time to presentment of two and three days.6
The prices of private package delivery services—United Parcel Service
(UPS) and Federal Express—provide another rough guide to the cost of accel-
erating check presentment. The major services offer different delivery speeds at
different prices. Assuming that prices in these relatively competitive businesses
closely reﬂect costs, the price of overnight delivery can be compared to the
price of slower delivery options to provide a crude estimate of the relative
5 These estimates are only an upper bound on the relevant cost ﬁgures since they include
the processing costs associated with receiving checks at paying banks.
6 Note that ﬂoat earnings (MPB) vary in proportion to the face value of the check, while
costs generally do not. Marginal social beneﬁts from reduced fraud losses are probably at least
proportional to the face value of the check. Thus if payees are able to choose different clearing
methods for different checks, then for large value checks the MPB and the MSB curves will be
shifted upward, while the MPC curve will stay ﬁxed. If it is too costly for payees to discriminate
between checks, it is the average values of MPB and MSB that are relevant.       
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cost of overnight presentment and slower presentment.7 The analogy between
check presentment and package delivery is certainly imperfect; check present-
ment deadlines do not precisely match package company delivery deadlines, the
items being shipped have different physical properties, and the package compa-
nies are able to track shipments in real time. Nonetheless, there are important
similarities that make the comparison useful. Both use the same transportation
technologies—airplanes and trucks. Both involve substantial sorting en route.
And both process substantial volumes—63 billion checks annually (bundled
together in packages) versus over 900 million items annually for Federal Ex-
press and 180 million items annually for UPS. In fact, both UPS and Federal
Express contract with check processing ﬁrms to transport and present checks
for them.
Table 2 displays sample shipping costs for UPS and Federal Express from
Richmond, Virginia, to various locations. The Federal Reserve presents checks
to all these locations by 2:00 p.m. the next day at the latest. For UPS letter
delivery, delaying delivery by 25 1/2 hours, from 10:30 a.m. the next day to noon
the second day, saves over 30 percent of the cost of next-day delivery. Delaying
next-day delivery until late the second day (yielding third-day funds availability
under current check presentment rules) saves about half the cost, while delaying
delivery until late the third day (fourth-day funds availability) saves about 60
percent of the cost. For a one-pound package with UPS, delaying delivery to
the third day saves about 70 percent of the costs. For a one-pound package sent
via Federal Express, the savings are even larger. Delivery late the second day
(third-day funds availability) reduces costs by almost 80 percent. These ﬁgures
suggest that delaying check presentment could eliminate a substantial portion
of check processing and handling costs.
Rough empirical calculations indicate, therefore, that current check ﬂoat ar-
rangements impose potentially signiﬁcant social costs on the payment system.
Are there offsetting social beneﬁts?
Some Attempts to Explain the Check Float Puzzle
Eliminating Nonpar Presentment
As mentioned above, the presentment of checks is governed by legal restric-
tions that require that checks be paid at par on the day they are presented (see
7 The analogy assumes that the price of delivery within a certain time frame closely approxi-
mates the average cost of delivery within that time frame. One potential weakness of this analogy
is the possibility that there is a large ﬁxed cost component and that the price differentials reﬂect
different demand elasticities rather than different average costs. Price differentials are nonetheless
limited by incremental and stand-alone costs; for either delivery option, slow or fast, the price
must lie above the incremental cost and below the stand-alone cost for prices to be efﬁcient and
sustainable: see Weinberg (1994). If the demand for fast delivery is less elastic, as one might
expect, then the price for slow delivery will lie close to the incremental cost of slow delivery, in
which case the price differential will be no less than the difference in incremental costs.         
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Baltimore $11.00 $ 7.50 $ 5.75 $ 4.40
Birmingham 12.50 8.00 6.25 4.90
San Francisco 13.50 9.50 7.25 5.80
UPS: One-Pound Package
Baltimore $14.00 $ 7.75 $ 6.25 $ 4.40
Birmingham 17.25 8.25 6.75 4.90
San Francisco 20.00 10.50 8.25 5.80








$47.50 $22.50 $ 9.95
Sources: United Parcel Service (1997); Federal Express Corporation (1996).
footnote 2). Do such legal restrictions serve any efﬁciency-enhancing role that
might justify the inefﬁciencies caused by excessively rapid check presentment?
The current system of presentment regulations arose over the last 90 years
since the founding of the Fed. Before the Fed was established in 1914, many
banks charged presentment or “exchange” fees on checks sent to them for
payment. Some state laws at the time held that a check presented “over the
counter” shall be paid at par, but presentment fees could be charged when
the collecting bank presented by indirect means, such as by mail. The banks
charging presentment fees (so-called nonpar banks) were often small and rural,
and they justiﬁed their fees as a way of covering the cost of remitting funds
by shipping bank notes to the collecting bank.8
In drafting the Federal Reserve Act, the Reserve Banks were given the
power to clear and collect checks, in part to help attract members to the Federal
Reserve System (Stevens 1996). While national banks were required to become
members, few state-chartered banks joined the System in the early years. At
8 The term par presentment is generally taken to refer broadly to the right to present by
indirect means such as mail or courier service and still receive par.     
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ﬁrst the Reserve Banks tried a voluntary clearing system in which they accepted
at par only checks drawn on other members who agreed to accept checks at
par. This scheme failed to attract enough participants and was abandoned after
a year in favor of the somewhat misnamed “compulsory” system in July 1916.9
Under the new scheme Reserve Banks accepted checks drawn on any member
banks or on nonmember banks that agreed to accept checks at par. The Re-
serve Banks campaigned hard to get banks to agree to accept at par and had
greater success. Congress helped by revising the Federal Reserve Act in 1917,
adding a provision that no presentment fees could be charged against the Fed,
although speciﬁcally authorizing “reasonable charges” against other presenting
banks. The Reserve Banks thus acquired the unique legal privilege of being
able to present at par by indirect means, such as by mail. Membership increased
dramatically in the years that followed, and the Reserve Banks were successful
in signiﬁcantly curtailing, though not eliminating, nonpar banking. Presentment
fees were effectively eliminated in 1994 when the Fed introduced regulations
that mandated same-day settlement for checks presented by 8:00 a.m.
The conventional view is that par presentment regulations were instru-
mental in allowing the Fed to enter the check clearing business and that this
enhanced the efﬁciency of the check collection system. If so, then eliminating
inefﬁciencies in check collection represents a social beneﬁt that might outweigh
the social waste due to excessively fast presentment. One potential explanation
of the check ﬂoat puzzle, then, is that it reﬂects a side effect of a par presentment
regime whose net social beneﬁts are positive.
Two types of claims have been made about the efﬁciency-enhancing role of
par presentment. The ﬁrst argument, advanced by contemporary observers just
after the founding of the Fed, was that presentment fees resulted in wasteful
practices on the part of collecting banks seeking to avoid them. After the check
is written and accepted in payment, the paying bank has a monopoly on the
ability to redeem the check. Paying banks would set charges well above costs
to extract rents from collecting banks (Spahr 1926). Payee banks would in turn
try to avoid paying what they saw as exorbitant fees. A bank typically would
have a network of correspondent banks with whom it exchanged checks. A
correspondent bank would present checks directly on behalf of the sending
bank or would send the check on to another correspondent, hoping it had an
arrangement for direct presentment. The second correspondent might then send
the check further on, and so forth. Checks sometimes traveled circuitous routes
as banks sought a correspondent whom they hoped would allow them to avoid
presentment charges (Cannon 1901). Such practices, it was asserted, resulted
in wasteful shipping costs and inefﬁcient delay in payment.
9 One reason the voluntary scheme failed was the policy of crediting and debiting banks
immediately when checks were received. There was a lag before banks were informed of debits,
which made reserve management difﬁcult and overdrafts frequent.     
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A second argument for the efﬁciency-enhancing role of par presentment is
advanced by modern critics of the pre-Fed check collection system. Unilaterally
set presentment fees allow a bank to increase retail market share by raising the
costs of rival depository institutions (McAndrews and Roberds 1997; McAn-
drews 1995). Nonpar banking allows a “vertical price squeeze” in which a bank
inefﬁciently raises the price of an upstream input (presentment) purchased by
a bank that is a rival in a downstream market (retail deposit-taking).10 Present-
ment fees are an anticompetitive practice, according to this argument, and the
establishment of par presentment eliminated the associated inefﬁciencies.11
These two arguments fail to explain the check ﬂoat puzzle. Regarding the
ﬁrst argument, it is not at all obvious that nonpar banking was inefﬁcient. It is
important to note that a collecting bank was not completely at the mercy of the
paying bank. Collecting banks always had the option of ﬁnding a correspondent
to present directly on their behalf, thereby avoiding the presentment fee. Com-
petition between correspondent banks ultimately governed the cost of clearing
checks drawn on distant banks and placed a ceiling on the presentment fees
banks could charge. Moreover, the occasional circuitous routing of checks is
not obviously inefﬁcient, given the necessity of relying on a network of bilateral
relationships (Weinberg 1997). It is a common feature of network transportation
and communication arrangements; after all, the circuitous routing of telephone
calls is not taken as evidence of inefﬁciency.
Another common feature of network arrangements is the presence of ﬁxed
costs. In such settings there typically is a range of prices consistent with efﬁ-
ciency and sustainability. Each participant obviously will prefer to bear as little
of the ﬁxed costs as possible. Critics of presentment fees wanted paying banks
to bear more of the common costs of check clearing. Defenders of presentment
fees wanted collecting banks to bear more of the costs. The par presentment
controversy appears to have had more to do with distributional issues than with
economic efﬁciency.
The view that presentment fees can facilitate a vertical price squeeze is
based on models that take many important aspects of the institutional arrange-
ments governing check clearing as ﬁxed. Models in which such arrangements
are endogenous can have very different predictions. For example, Weinberg
(1997) describes a model of check clearing in which outcomes are efﬁcient,
even without restrictions on presentment fees. Such models are attractive in
this setting because, historically, check clearing has often involved cooperative
arrangements between banks, such as clearinghouses. Moreover, the banks most
susceptible to a vertical price squeeze by the nonpar banks were located close
10 See Salop and Scheffman (1983) for a basic exposition, and Laffont (1996) and Econo-
mides, Lopomo, and Woroch (1996) for applications to network industries.
11 McAndrews (1995) argues that the imposition of any uniform presentment fee would
sufﬁce to eliminate this inefﬁciency.   
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by, and were the very banks that could present directly. The banks that bore
the brunt of presentment fees were those located at a distance and thus least
likely to lose retail customers to the paying bank.
More to the point, check clearing arrangements provided the same in-
centives to accelerate presentment both before and after the founding of the
Fed. Under state laws and established common law principles, the presenting
bank was entitled to immediate payment at par for checks presented over the
counter. Thus a bank presenting directly to the paying bank faced the same
relative incentives before and after the entry of the Fed into check clearing;
getting the check there one day earlier resulted in one day’s worth of inter-
est. Over-the-counter presentment served as an anchor for the prices of other
means of presentment. It placed a bound on the payee bank’s willingness to
pay an exchange fee for presenting by mail or to pay a correspondent bank
for collecting the check. Neither the paying bank nor the correspondent bank
had any incentive to compensate the payee bank for the interest foregone be-
fore remitting the check. Thus the relevant property of the par presentment
regime predates the Fed’s entry into check clearing. The elimination of nonpar
presentment cannot explain the check ﬂoat puzzle.
Reducing Check Fraud
Another possible explanation of the check ﬂoat puzzle is that clearing checks
faster reduces check fraud losses to paying banks and their customers. Helen’s
bank might be willing to compensate John’s bank for getting the checks to
them sooner because it reduces the expense associated with check fraud.
There are various ways in which banks and their customers can lose money
to check fraud. Someone possessing lost or stolen checks can forge the account
holder’s signature or the endorsement. Checks can be altered without the ac-
count holder’s approval. Counterfeit checks resemble genuine checks and can
sometimes be used to obtain funds. Checks can be written on closed accounts.
Fraudulent balances can be created through “kiting”—writing a check before
covering funds have been deposited.
When Helen’s check is presented for payment her bank can verify the
signature and the authenticity of the check and can verify that the account
contains sufﬁcient funds. If her bank chooses to dishonor the check, it must
initiate return of the check by midnight of the business day following the day
the check was presented. The check is then returned to John’s bank. If Helen’s
bank paid the check when it was presented, then a payment is made in the
opposite direction when the check is returned. Otherwise Helen’s bank returns
the check without paying.
Note, however, that if Helen’s bank returns the check, Helen’s bank bears
no loss. John and his bank now have a check that was dishonored, and between
them they bear the loss (or else seek compensation from Helen). John and his        
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bank can be expected to take into account the effect of the speed of check
clearing on the likelihood of their fraud losses. Therefore, the losses experi-
enced by payees and their banks do not help explain the check ﬂoat puzzle.
The losses that are relevant to our puzzle are those borne by Helen and her
bank. They would be willing to compensate John’s bank to induce more rapid
clearing if that helped reduce their own check fraud losses.12
There are a number of reasons why check fraud losses to the paying bank
might be reduced if it received the check faster. Helen’s bank may allow the
time limit for check returns to elapse before ﬁnding out that the check is
forged or that Helen has closed her account. Some banks, for example, do
not routinely verify signatures. In this case, Helen’s bank bears the loss. Such
losses might be lower for checks presented faster. Helen’s bank might want to
provide an implicit reward to John’s bank for rapid presentment. In principle,
then, the desire to encourage rapid check clearing to discourage check fraud
might explain the check ﬂoat puzzle.
But is the check fraud effect large enough empirically to explain the check
ﬂoat puzzle? Does getting the check to Helen’s bank one day faster reduce
fraud losses at Helen’s bank by enough to justify providing John’s bank with
one more day’s interest on the funds? According to a recent Board of Governors
report to Congress (Board of Governors 1996), check fraud losses incurred by
U.S. commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions amounted to $615.4 million
in 1995. Some check fraud losses occur to banks in their role as collectors of
checks drawn on other banks, and some occur to banks in their role as payors of
checks drawn on other banks. Of the total estimated check fraud loss mentioned
above, only about half—$310.6 million—represents losses to banks as payors.
The remainder represents losses to banks as collectors. As noted above, only
check fraud losses to the payor are directly relevant to the check ﬂoat puzzle.
The ﬁgures just cited are gross losses, however. The Board study reports
that depository institutions recovered a total of $256.0 million on past check
fraud losses in 1995, although it does not indicate how these recoveries were di-
vided between paying banks and collecting banks. If we take these as estimates
of steady-state losses and recoveries, and if we assume that recoveries are the
same fraction of gross losses for both collecting banks and paying banks, then
paying banks experienced net check fraud losses of $181.4 million in 1995.13
Average net check fraud losses at paying banks therefore amounted to less
12 Figure 1 could be modiﬁed to account for the desire of John and his bank to reduce their
check fraud losses. The marginal beneﬁt from reducing their expected losses should be added to
the marginal private beneﬁt curve MPB. The same amount should be added to the marginal social
beneﬁt curve, MSB, as well, so the net distortion remains the same.
13 Recoveries by paying banks are (50.5%) £ ($256.0 million) or $129.2 million, so net
losses are $310.6 million minus $129.2 million, or $181.4 million. Note that the resulting ﬁgure
is conservative in the sense that if check volume is growing, then this procedure underestimates
the ratio of recoveries to gross losses.              
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than 0.0003 cents per dollar in 1995.14 In comparison, one day’s interest on
the check, at a 5.5 percent annual rate (the current overnight Fed funds rate),
is worth 0.015 cents per dollar; more than 50 times as large as the average rate
of net check fraud losses at paying banks.
The check fraud loss ﬁgure is the average net loss, however. The relevant
ﬁgure is the marginal effect on net fraud loss of clearing a check one day faster.
It could conceivably be the case that, say, the expected fraud loss on a check
cleared in two days exceeds the expected loss on a check cleared in one day by
0.015 cents per dollar, the value of the ﬂoat, even while the average check fraud
loss is 0.0003 cents per dollar. Unfortunately, there are no ﬁgures available that
would allow us to estimate directly marginal net fraud losses. However, for the
average net expected loss to be as small as 0.0003 cents while the marginal
loss associated with clearing a check in two days rather than one day is as
large as 0.015 would require that no more than 2 percent of checks take two
or more days to clear.15 No more than 2 percent is quite implausible, however,
given the ﬁgures in Table 1, which show that a substantial portion of checks
take two days or more to clear. Thus, even though we do not have a direct
measure of the marginal expected fraud loss associated with clearing a check
one day slower, the evidence strongly suggests that fraud loss at paying banks
does not explain the distribution of check ﬂoat earnings.
Check writers themselves sometimes suffer losses due to check fraud. Per-
haps Helen’s desire to limit her own check fraud losses makes her and her
bank willing to forego the extra interest earnings in order to induce more rapid
clearing of her checks. There are two principal methods by which a depositor
could lose money due to check fraud. One is if Helen fails to inspect periodic
bank statements for forged or unauthorized checks, she can be apportioned
14 Calculated as $181.4 million divided by $73.5 trillion (dollar value of checks written in
1995 [Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the central banks of the Group of Ten
countries 1995]) = 0.0003.
15 Let ®i be the fraction of checks (by value) cleared in i days, and let °i be the expected
fraud loss on checks cleared in i days. Expected fraud loss is then ®1°1 + ®2°2 + ... =
0.0003. Suppose, hypothetically, that the marginal loss associated with clearing one extra day,
°i+1 ¡ °i, is at least 0.015. What values of ®1 are consistent with these two assumptions? The
most optimistic case, in the sense that the allowable range for ®1 is the largest, is one in which
all checks clear in either one or two days, because the longer it takes to clear the larger the
expected loss. As long as °i+1 ¸ °i, the best case is for ®i to be as small as possible for i ¸ 3,
because increasing the weights on the days with larger losses makes it harder to match the average
loss ﬁgure of 0.0003. Assume therefore that ®i = 0 for i ¸ 3. Similarly, the most optimistic
assumption to make about °1 is °1 = 0, because increasing °1, the expected loss on the smallest
loss day, just makes it harder to match the average loss ﬁgure. Our two postulates are now (1 ¡
®1)°2 = 0.0003, and °2 ¸ 0.015, which together imply that 1 ¡ ®1 · (0.0003/0.015) = 0.02.
Looked at another way, for given fractions ®i, how large can °2 ¡ °1 be and still satisfy
®1°1 +®2°2 + ... =0.0003 and °i+1 ¸ °i? The answer is 0.0003/(1¡®1). From the ﬁgures
in Table 1 this ranges from 0.0005 to 0.005, or 3.5 to 32.3 percent of the monetary value of one
day’s worth of ﬂoat.      
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some of the loss on grounds of negligence. But the timeliness of check clear-
ing is only marginally important in such cases, since they involve inspecting
monthly bank statements.
Another method by which a depositor could lose money involves “de-
mand drafts,” one-time pre-authorized checks written by merchants or vendors
after taking a depositor’s bank account number over the phone. In place of
the customer’s signature the check is stamped “pre-approved” or “signature on
ﬁle.” Demand drafts are cleared the same way as conventional checks and have
many legitimate uses, but they have been used in telemarketing scams. It seems
unlikely that the detection and prosecution of such fraud depends signiﬁcantly
on the speed with which demand drafts are cleared. Most cases seem to be
discovered when a depositor’s bank statement is inspected. Moreover, such
fraud only affects demand drafts, and these are a tiny fraction of all checks
written.16 So in neither case does fraud loss by check writers appear to be a
plausible rationale for the allocation of check ﬂoat earnings.
There is an additional reason to doubt that fraud losses could ever ex-
plain why the collecting bank should lose interest earnings until the check is
presented. The relevant interest rate is the nominal overnight rate, and thus
will vary directly with expected inﬂation, other things being equal. There is
no reason why the additional expected fraud loss associated with clearing a
check in two days rather than one should have any necessary relationship with
the inﬂation rate. Indeed, the inefﬁciency caused by the fact that checks do
not bear interest parallels exactly the traditional welfare cost of anticipated
inﬂation, which is caused by the fact that currency does not bear interest.
The inefﬁciency of currency use arises because people go to excessive lengths
to avoid holding it. Similarly, check ﬂoat arrangements cause banks to go to
excessive lengths to avoid holding checks. In both cases the problem is that
the rate of return is artiﬁcially depressed by inﬂation. The difference between
the two is that, apart from changing the inﬂation rate, altering the rate of return
on currency, say by paying interest, appears to be technologically difﬁcult. In
contrast, as I argue below, the technology to alter the rate of return on checks
appears to be readily available.17
The Expedited Funds Availability Act
When an account holder deposits a check at a bank, the common banking
practice is to place a “hold” on the funds for a number of days until the bank is
16 Legitimate demand drafts probably amount to less than $1 billion a year. Jodie Bernstein,
Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, reported one estimate that “nine of the current
twenty demand draft service bureaus process approximately 38,000 demand drafts weekly, totaling
over ﬁve million dollars.... ”I nother words, $250 million annually (Bernstein 1996).
17 Reducing inﬂation to the socially optimal rate would accomplish the desired objective,
but I take that as outside the realm of check regulatory policy.   
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certain that the check has cleared. The bank customer is not allowed to withdraw
the funds until the hold is removed. This practice protects the bank from fraud
by shifting some of the risk to the account holder. In 1987 Congress passed the
Expedited Funds Availability Act (EFAA), which asked the Federal Reserve to
promulgate regulations limiting the length of time banks can hold customers’
funds. Maximum holds vary from one to ﬁve business days, depending on the
type of check and whether or not it is a “local” item.
Legal restrictions on the duration of holds can be an incentive to accelerate
check presentment. After the hold is released, the funds may be withdrawn, and
the bank may suffer a loss if the check is returned unpaid. Does this explain
the check ﬂoat puzzle? The answer is clearly no. Congress enacted the EFAA
to respond to concerns that holds were longer than were necessary to ascertain
whether the check would be returned unpaid. The EFAA explicitly instructs the
Federal Reserve Board to reduce the allowable time periods to the minimum
consistent with allowing a bank to “reasonably expect to learn of the nonpay-
ment of most items.” The hold periods, in other words, are tailored to the speed
with which checks are actually being collected, not the other way around.
The EFAA constrains the distribution of the risk of nonpayment between
the payee and the payee’s bank. But it does nothing to alter the incentive
both parties have to take steps to reduce their joint losses from fraud. The
EFAA does increase the ability of payees to perpetrate fraud on their banks
and so provides an extra incentive for payee banks to accelerate presentment.
If the EFAA artiﬁcially discouraged faster presentment, such discouragement
might explain the need for the compensating stimulus provided by the current
check ﬂoat arrangement. But if anything, the EFAA heightens the incentive to
accelerate presentment.
What Can Be Done?
I conclude that the social beneﬁt of accelerating check presentment is negligible
in comparison to the reward to collecting banks in the form of captured interest
earnings. Apparently this feature of the check clearing system does not have
an identiﬁable economic rationale. Without any offsetting social beneﬁts, we
are left with just the social costs described earlier.
Is there an alternative to the current arrangements governing check ﬂoat?
Is there a practical way to eliminate the artiﬁcial incentive to accelerate the
presentment of checks? After all, it could be the case that the current scheme
has deadweight social costs but is superior to all feasible alternatives. Is there
a feasible alternative that does not require the deadweight social costs noted
above?
Consider ﬁrst what properties an ideal arrangement would possess. In an
ideal arrangement the value to John’s bank of presenting a check one day sooner
would equal the real value to Helen and Helen’s bank of receiving the check
one day sooner. Fraud losses (to the payor bank) aside, John’s bank should  
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implicitly earn interest on the check while it is being cleared. Helen’s bank
should implicitly pay interest to John’s bank from the time at which John’s
bank received the check. John’s bank would then face no artiﬁcial inducement
to accelerate presentment. Note that John’s bank still has an incentive to clear
the check, since fraud losses to the payee bank are likely to increase the longer
it takes to clear the check. But the magnitude of the incentive to accelerate
presentment would match the social value of accelerating presentment.
Check fraud losses to the payor bank constitute an additional social value
of accelerating presentment. To account for these precisely, the implicit interest
rate on checks should be reduced by the marginal effect of delaying presentment
on payor fraud losses, resulting in a slight penalty for delaying presentment. As
noted previously, however, the marginal effect on payor bank fraud losses is
likely to be quite small when compared to the interest earnings at stake. In an
ideal arrangement, therefore, we should see checks in the process of collection
implicitly bearing interest at close to the overnight rate.
Implementing an ideal arrangement would require revising the current par
presentment regulations. One possibility is to have the paying bank pay explicit
interest on the face value of the check from the date the check was originally
accepted by the bank of ﬁrst deposit. The interest would be paid directly to
the presenting institution. The interest rate could be determined by reference
to a publicly available overnight rate. Regulations would stipulate that upon
presentment, the paying bank is accountable for the amount of the check plus
accrued interest from the date of ﬁrst deposit. The regulation would constrain
only the obligations of the paying bank. If the collecting bank was presenting
on behalf of some other bank, they could divide the interest between them as
they see ﬁt. Presumably each bank would receive the interest accruing while
the check was in their possession. Similarly, the regulation would be silent on
the division of interest between the bank of ﬁrst deposit and its customer.
A second possibility is for checks to be payable at par only at a ﬁxed
maturity date—say, ﬁve business days after the check is ﬁrst deposited in a
bank. Checks presented before ﬁve business days would be discounted, again
using a publicly available overnight interest rate as reference. After ﬁve days
an outstanding check would accrue interest at the reference rate. The maturity
date would determine the implicit division of revenues between paying banks
and payee banks.
The main practical difﬁculty facing any such scheme is to record and
transmit the date on which the check is ﬁrst deposited. Currently, the Fed-
eral Reserve’s Regulation CC requires that the bank at which the check is
ﬁrst deposited print on the back of the check certain information (the indorse-
ment), including the date. This information is used mostly in the process of
returning checks and is not machine-readable. Some information on a check
is machine-readable, however. At some point early in the clearing process, the
dollar amount is printed in magnetic ink on the bottom of the check front beside   
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the paying bank’s routing number and the payor’s bank account number. The
resulting string of digits and symbols—the so-called “MICR line” at the bottom
of the check—is read automatically as the check subsequently is processed. One
possibility would be to expand the MICR coding format to include the date
as well. Then the implicit interest obligation could be handled using the same
automated techniques used to handle the face amount. Although this alternative
regime would certainly involve transitional costs, the ﬁgures discussed above
indicate that the potential beneﬁts are substantial—perhaps as large as billions
of dollars per year.
Note that this proposal would have the side beneﬁt of facilitating improved
contractual arrangements between banks and their customers by giving them
more readily usable information on when a check was cleared. This infor-
mation could be used by banks to penalize kiting if they so desired. Banks
might charge check writers for the interest paid to the bank presenting a check.
The arrangement would be a matter of contractual choice for banks and their
customers, however, and would not affect the desirability of the proposal.
In the Meantime, There Are Some Important Implications
Until we establish a more rational scheme for allocating check ﬂoat earnings,
payment system policymakers apparently face a dilemma. They are often asked
to contemplate changes to the payment system that would alter the speed with
which some checks are cleared. One example is a proposal to close down the
Fed’s Remote Check Processing Centers (Benston and Humphrey 1997). This
would likely slow down the collection of some checks. Another example is a
proposal for electronic check presentment (ECP), which involves transmitting
electronically to paying banks the encoded information on checks (Stavins
1997). In this case, checks would likely be collected somewhat faster on
average.
How should such changes in check ﬂoat affect the decision? One point of
view (the “zero-sum view”) asserts that the change in ﬂoat earnings is merely
a transfer. The gain realized by payees and their banks from faster presentment
is exactly matched by a corresponding loss to payors and their banks. In this
view, changes in ﬂoat should be ignored in policy analysis. That is, in a social
cost-beneﬁt analysis, no weight should be given to changes in ﬂoat. This view
is in accord with the evidence cited above that the social beneﬁt of accelerating
check clearing is negligible.
The danger in this approach, however, is that payment system participants
respond to the (distorted) incentives embodied in the current arrangements;
consequently their reactions could be misgauged. Imagine that the Fed is con-
sidering a change that would increase check ﬂoat. For example, suppose that
the closure of an RCPC slowed down the collection of some deposited checks.
For the checks the Fed continues to process, the slowdown would reduce the     
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amount of resources wasted on accelerating presentment. But it would do noth-
ing to reduce the incentive banks have to accelerate presentment. Banks could
respond by clearing directly themselves or through private service providers,
rather than through the Fed, in order to minimize ﬂoat. If the social cost of
clearing checks outside the Fed is greater than the cost of clearing them through
the Fed, then there might be no net social savings to closing down the RCPC,
since the increase in private costs might outweigh the decrease in Fed costs.
A cost-beneﬁt analysis that ignored the effect of changes in ﬂoat could be
seriously misleading.
An alternative approach (the “empirical view”) would treat the overnight
interest rate as the social value of accelerating presentment, as if there is some
as-yet-undiscovered social beneﬁt of reducing check ﬂoat. This approach has
the advantage of aligning policy objectives with the incentives faced by private
participants in the check collection industry. The danger in this approach is the
risk of favoring speedy check presentment when it is not really in society’s best
interest. Suppose again that the Fed is considering closing an RCPC, but that
no banks switch to other means of clearing checks. The increase in ﬂoat would
be counted against closing the facility, under the empirical view. It could turn
out that, if one disregards the increased ﬂoat, then the net social beneﬁts of
closing the facility are positive (due to the resources saved by clearing more
slowly) but are negative when the value of the lost interest earnings to payee
banks is deducted.18 In this case, the empirical approach recommends against
closing the facility even though it really should be closed. By adopting the
empirical view, policymakers would be joining in the private sector’s wasteful
pursuit of ﬂoat.
The dilemma is more apparent than real, however. Policymakers should
focus on the implications for real resource costs of the proposals they are
considering and should exclude the purely pecuniary impact of reallocations of
check ﬂoat. But they should keep in mind that although ﬂoat does not reﬂect any
direct social beneﬁts, it does affect behavior. To the extent that reallocations of
ﬂoat induce behavioral changes that alter real resource use, the induced changes
in resource costs must be included in any cost-beneﬁt analysis.
Current ﬂoat arrangements can be thought of as imposing a tax paid by
presenting banks on checks cleared by slower methods, with the proceeds auto-
matically passed on to payor banks. The proper treatment of a tax in cost-beneﬁt
analysis is well understood. Absent other interventions, the taxed service (slow
clearing) will be undersupplied relative to the untaxed service (fast clearing)
for which it is a substitute. If a public entity like the Fed is active in supplying
the untaxed good, and unilaterally cuts back on its supply, providing more of
18 The ﬂoat that Reserve Banks experience is passed back to depositing banks. If, for exam-
ple, 97 percent of a particular class of checks is cleared in one day and the rest in two days, on
average, depositors receive 97 percent of their funds in one day and the rest in two days.     
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the taxed good instead, the net effect will depend on the market for the untaxed
good. At one extreme, the Fed might have many competitors whose costs and
prices are close to that of the Fed. In this case reducing the supply of the untaxed
service merely causes customers to switch to competitors—no improvement in
efﬁciency results. At the other extreme, if the Fed has few competitors for
the supply of the untaxed service—no other suppliers have costs close to the
Fed’s—then customers can be induced to switch to the socially superior taxed
good. Here, slowing down Fed check collection does not drive customers away,
with the result that check collection does indeed slow down and thus saves so-
cietal resources. Note that this outcome could increase costs to Fed customers
in the sense that Fed fees plus ﬂoat costs increase, even though social costs
decrease.
In the decision to close an RCPC, for example, the analysis should take
into account the effect of increased ﬂoat on depositing banks’ check clear-
ing choices. To the extent that increased ﬂoat causes banks to switch to
other providers—private check clearing services or correspondent banks, for
example—the increase in the real resource costs of alternative check clearing
operations should be counted against any savings in real resource costs asso-
ciated with Fed check clearing. The change in ﬂoat earnings itself should be
excluded from the calculation of net social beneﬁts, but the effect on bank
choices must be taken into account.
In evaluating ECP, the ﬂoat beneﬁts to payees from faster presentment
should not count as a social beneﬁt, as Joanna Stavins (1997) correctly points
out. If ECP is offered under current par presentment regulations, however, the
beneﬁts of ﬂoat arising from faster presentment (assuming they are passed back
to depositing banks, as is current Fed practice) would be an artiﬁcial stimulus
to the adoption of ECP. If ECP is offered at prices that are efﬁcient (relative
to the real resource costs of ECP) and the extra ﬂoat earnings from faster
presentment are passed on to payees, then ECP may be adopted where it is not
socially efﬁcient.19 For some checks ECP might be more costly than physical
presentment, and yet customers would prefer ECP because of the beneﬁts of
reduced ﬂoat. The Fed should avoid deploying ECP in market segments where
it would increase social costs, even if it would decrease Fed customers’ costs
(including ﬂoat costs).
More generally, the check ﬂoat problem can distort the process of tech-
nological innovation by artiﬁcially promoting techniques that accelerate check
presentment. Payment system participants have an incentive to ﬁnd new ways
19 ECP with check truncation is often said to involve “network effects” because such a
scheme would be most valuable if universally adopted, eliminating all paper presentment. The
same logic applies, however. The set of prices that are efﬁcient and sustainable relative to re-
source costs alone will not in general coincide with the set of prices that are efﬁcient relative to
the aggregate of resource costs and ﬂoat costs. See Weinberg (1997) regarding network effects in
payment arrangements.          
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to reduce their holdings of non-interest-bearing assets, like currency and checks
(Lacker 1996). This incentive is merely an artifact of the inﬂation tax, and thus
does not represent any fundamental social beneﬁt (Emmons 1996). The check
ﬂoat problem is another example of the way inﬂation can distort the payment
system.
The check ﬂoat puzzle has important implications for the role of the Fed-
eral Reserve in the check clearing industry. The Fed currently enjoys certain
competitive advantages over private participants. One involves the disparity
in presentment times mentioned above; the Fed can present until 2:00 p.m.
for same-day funds, while others must present before 8:00 a.m. for same-day
funds (unless varied by agreement). This disparity gives the Fed a competitive
advantage, because depositors can be offered a later deposit deadline at a cost
lower than that of a private provider. Having such a competitive advantage
would allow the Fed, should it so desire, to improve the efﬁciency of check
collection by slowing down presentment and increasing check ﬂoat beyond that
which the private market would provide.20 It gives the Fed an ability to offset
some of the deleterious side effects of par presentment regulations. Note that
this outcome is the opposite of the original justiﬁcation of the Fed’s role in
check clearing provided by opponents of presentment fees, who claimed that
the Fed would result in more rapid check clearing.
The Fed’s advantage over private providers of check clearing services has
been eroding over time. In 1980 Congress passed the Monetary Control Act,
which required that the Fed charge prices for its payment services comparable to
those that would be charged by private providers. Effective in 1994, Regulation
CC was amended to allow “same-day settlement”—private presentment as late
as 8:00 a.m. for same-day funds. Because of these changes and other factors,
the Fed’s market share has been steadily eroding in recent years (Summers
and Gilbert 1996). Payment system efﬁciency no doubt helped motivate this
movement towards a “level playing ﬁeld.” And yet these changes have reduced
20 To see this, consider the following simpliﬁed situation. The Fed faces private providers
with costs of °1 of clearing a check in one day and °2 of clearing a check in two days. The value
of one day’s ﬂoat on a typical item is i. Under competitive conditions the cost to a depositor is
°1 + i for clearing privately in one day, and °2 + 2i for clearing privately in two days. Clearing
in two days is socially optimal, so °1 >° 2, there being no other relevant social costs or beneﬁts
associated with check clearing. But under the current regime checks are collected (inefﬁciently)
in one day; that is, °1 + i <° 2+2 i ,o r° 1¡i<° 2 . The Fed offers check clearing, but only
two-day clearing. Suppose the Fed’s cost of clearing in two days is ±2, and the Fed charges p
per item. Cost recovery requires (a) p ¸ ±2. Can the Fed attract depositors that are now clearing
privately in one day? This requires (b) p + 2i <° 1+i . Together, (a) and (b) are feasible if
±2 <° 1¡i<° 2. The Fed’s presentment time advantage implies that the Fed can present checks
in a given number of days at lower cost than the private sector can present checks in the same
number of days: in other words, ±2 is strictly less than °2, as required. Thus the Fed’s presentment
time advantage allows the Fed to reduce check clearing time from one day to two days in this
example, improving the efﬁciency of the check collection.       
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the Fed’s ability to unilaterally improve the efﬁciency of check collection by
slowing down check presentment.
Now is a good time, therefore, to reexamine the Fed’s role in the check
collection industry and the payment system more broadly.21 As noted earlier,
the rationale for the Fed’s original entry into check collection was to improve
efﬁciency. But the par presentment regulations that once aided the Fed’s en-
try are now clearly an impediment to efﬁciency. Can the Fed still play an
efﬁciency-enhancing role in the presence of par presentment regulations? Can
the Fed implement technological improvements to the payment system without
removing inefﬁcient par presentment regulations? These questions should be at
the heart of any reexamination of the Fed’s role in the payment system.
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